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Abatract
This paper examines a duopoly model in which firms have to decide
sirnultaneously on product innovation and compatibility: successor
technologies can be designed to be compatible or incompatible with
the established industry standard. We show that in mazkets witá
homogeneous consumers, there may be a market bias towards a new
standard (excess momentum), despite the presence of network exter-
nalities and an installed base of users of the old standard. In markets
with heterogeneous consumers, suH' icient conditions for the coexistence
of two incompatióle networks are derived. Excess momentum and ex-
cess inertia can arise. Finally, equilibria may exhibit too little as well
as too much variety, relative to the social optimum.
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1 Introduction
Decisions on innovation often have implications for compatibility; for in-
stance, the decision to develop and introduce the compact-disc technology
was at the same time a decision to have a dramatically new product which
was incompatible with the existing long-playing records technology. A more
recent case concerns the successors of the Compact Cassette (CC) technology.
Philips has developed the Digital Compact Cassette technology, compatible
with the CC technology in the sense that old tapes can be played on the
new equipmenL. In contrast, Sony decided to pursue an incompatible tech-
nology named Mini Disc. It is therefore clear that decisions on technology
are simultaneously decisions about compatibility. This paper considers mar-
kets with such features, endogenizes firms' decisions concerning technological
change, and examines the nature of market incentives for innovation. We aze
concerned with questions such as the following: Does the existence of an in-
stalled base (of an old technology) make innovation more dif~icult? What role
does the principle of differentiation play in determining product~technology
variety in markets with network externalities?r
We consider a dynamic duopoly market in which the firms have to decide
on the nature of the successor technology: an opgrnding of the existing tech-
nology allows a firm to retain compatibility with the established industry
network, whereas a major innovation commits it to a replacement technology
which is incompatible with the extant standard. Firms compete in prices
after they make their technological choices.
This economic process is formally modelled as a sequential game, and we
study the fulfilled expectations equilibria of this game. Markets with only
óomogeneous consumers as well as markets with heterogenmus consumers
are considered. For markets with homogeneous consumers, we focus, by hav-
ing consumers coordinating, on equilibria which are effiicient for them. For
this class of equilibria we prove that innovations may occur in excess of what
is socially desirable. The source of this inef6ciency is the presence of network
1The principle ofdiRerentiation says that firms competing in prices wish to differentiate
themselvea from each other in the product space, in order to reduce competition (see Tirole
(1988), chapter 7).z
e~xternalit,ies, since in the absence of network externalities, market outcomes
wo~Jd bi~ socially c~llii-irnt iu our ntodi~l. l.iir marki~l.s wil.h h~~torugi~ncous
consumers, sufficient conditions for the coexistence of two incompatible net-
works (an upgraded and a new, incompatible technology), are derived. It
is shown that, depending on the parameter values, such market outcomes
may exhibit excessive innovation or too little innovation. Furthermore, we
show that these equilibria may exhibit too little as well as too much technol-
ogy~producL varicty (rclativc Lo the social optimum).
Our paper is part of a more general literature on the role of network
externalities in markets (see for instance, Katz and Shapiro (1985), (1986a),
(1986b), (1992), Farrell and 5aloner (1985), (1986a), (1986b)). In particular,
Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986a) and Katz and Shapiro (1992) investigate
the impact of network externalities on technological innovation and are more
closely related to our paper.
Farrell and Saloner (1985) consider a model where a new technology is
exogenously made available and where the presence of network externalities
gives rise to a type of coordination game. They show that with common-
knowledge about payoffs from a new technology, the socially optimal outwme
18 RlWays Rttalll(YI; huwi~ver, if these payolls are private iuformation Lhcu too
little innovation, (excess inertia) as well as too much innovation, (excesa mo-
mentum), may arise.Z In contrast, in our paper, the nature ofnew technology
is endogenously determined, firms have complete information about relevant
variables and we focus on equilibria that rule out inef6ciencies due to coordi-
nation failures (see assumptions 2.4 and 2.5 below). The results in our paper
thus point to different sources of sub-optimal innovation. These sources are:
(i) firms do not take consumer benefits into account while they make their
technology decisions, and (ii) consumers who make adoption decisions for
new technologies do not care about the ustranded base" effect that occurs
when the network of users of an old technology ceases to grow.
Farrell and Saloner (19866) study consumer adoption strategies where
there is one existing technology and one entrant (or new) incompatible tech-
~A well-known example of excesa inertia is the existence ofsuperior alternatives for the
QWERTY-layout o( keyboards, see David (1985).3
nology. Ilere again the nature of technological change is, in a sense, exoge-
nously given. Moreover, the incumbent firm which `sponsors' the existing
technology is not allowed any opportunity of technological change.
Katz and Shapiro ( 199`l) provide a very general analysis of the problem of
pruduct innuval.ion in markets with network externalities. A basic di(ference
between our paper and Katz and Shapiro is that they allow for technol-
ogy choices to be independent of compatibility choices, i.e., decisions about
technological change do not preclude any decisions about compatibility. This
goes against the grain of the example about technological change in the audio
market, given above. In terms of the modelling there are two interesting dif-
ferences between the two papers; first, unlike their paper where only one firm
can innovate, we allow for both firms in the market to make decisions con-
cerning innovation, and second, whereas they have homogeneous consumera
in the market we also consider markets with heterogeneous consumers. Thus,
our paper complements the analysis by Katz and Shapiro.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the model with
homogeneous consumers. Equilibria are derived and compared to welfaze
maximizing outcomes. Section 3 investigates the model with heterogeneous
consumers. We study coexistence of networks of incompatible technologies
and provide examples in which inefficiencies occur. Finally, section 4 containa
the conclusion.
2 A model with homogeneous consumers
2.1 The model
Consider the following dynamic duopoly. There are three periods, t- 0,1, 2,
and two firms, denoted by A and B. At the beginning of the game (period
0), the firms simultaneously decide whether to upgrade (u) or to replace (r)
their initial tectrnologies or products. Each firm has a set of actions {u,r} at
this stage of the game. In period 1, the firms sell their initial products, while
in period 2, they sell their upgraded or new technologies. This sequential
structure incorporates the idea that developing successor technologies is a4
time consuming activity.
The initial (or period-1) technologies, sA and sB, are compatible with
each other. A firm can choose to go in for an upgraded product, u; (which is
compatible with the existing industry standard) or a completely new product,
r; which is incompatible with the extant industry standard. Furthermore, we
assume that uA and uB are compatible, while rA and rB are incompatible
with each othcr. In period 2 only u; or r; are available to consumers. (Thia
is not a restriction, since even if firms had the option of persisting with the
old standard they would not do so in equilibrium.)
'I'he marginal cost of firm i when it produces technology x; is c~;, where
x; - s;,u;, r;. In period 1, the firms have identical marginal costs, denoted by
c- c.~ - c,8. However, cost asymmetries arise in the subsequent period. We
assume that firm A has a marginal cost advantage with respect to upgrading,
c,,,, G c„b, while firm B has a cost advantage when it introduces a new
technology, cTB G c,~. Additionally, producing an upgraded version is more
costly than producing the initial product, and replacing a technology is in
turn more costly than upgrading a product. This can be written as cT; 1
Cu~ 1 ~, t, 9 - A, B.
Consumers are infinitesemal. In period t- 1,2, Ni is the exogenously
given size of the set of consumers, that is, it has measure Ni. The consumers
in period 2 belong to a new generation; they are not in the market in period 1.
A consumer living in period t has a completely inelastic demand for one unit
of the good in that period, therefore, period-1 consumers cannot postpone
their purcha.v~ decision until period 2. Adoption decisions in each period are
made simultaneously by all consumers in that period.
The following assumption captures the idea that consumers are homoge-
neous.
Assumption 2.1 Consumers are homogeneous in the sense that they have
the same gross óenefit function b(x,n), where x is the technology that is pur-
chased, and n is the size of the set of consumers buying ultimately compatible
products (the network size at the end of period 2~.
Consumers maximize their net benefits b(x, n) - p by making a choice5
between the available products, where p is the price in the period at hand
for technology x. Their utility reservation level is 0.
Network externalities are incorporated in the model by assuming that
the benefit function is increasing in the number of conaumers purchasing
compatible items:
Assumption 2.2 6(x,n) ) 6(x,m) whenevern ~ m,dx.
The following assumption concerna symmetry of benefit functions across
firms, given equal network sizes.
Asaumption 2.3 Given network size n, 6(sA,n) - 6(sB,n), 6(uq,n) -
6(uB, n), nnd 6(rA, n) - 6(rB, n).
Since a consmner decides simultaneously with the other consumers in regard-
ing his product, he must have beliefs about what the other consumers will
do. The beliefs of a period-t consumer are captured in p~, defined as the
belieís on the fraction of consumers in period t purchasing from firm A.
Period-1 consumers can observe the pair of actions chosen by the firms
at time 0. The structum of the game is understood by the players (there is
complete information) and this is common knowledge.
The firms compete in prices. The price of firm i in period t is denoted
by p;~, í- A,B, t- 1,2. Let m; E {u,r} denote the action of firm i in
period 0, i - A,B. In period 1, firm i earns profits equal to rr;l(P;l,p~l) -
n;~ (p;~, p~~ )(p;~ -c), t- 1, 2, i~ j, when it has sales of n;~. Profits in period
2 are defined in an equivalent manner: ~r;z(p;z,p~~) - n;z(p;z,pjz) (p;~ - c~~),
where x; - u; if rn; - u, and x; - r; if m; - r.
Finally, we implicitly assume that gross benefits are sufFiciently large so
that all consumers buy. Thus, prices will not be too high relative to grosa
benefits.
2.2 Equilibrium concept
The equilibrium notion used is fulfilled expectations equilibrium (Katz and
Shapiro (1985) use a similar equilibrium notion). An equilibrium consista of6
technology choices (mÁ, mB), prices (pA~, p'Bi), consumer beliefs pi, and sizes
of consumer groups purchasing from each firm (nAi,nBi), f- 1,2, such that
(t-2) Given (m;,m~), (p;~,p~~), (n;~,n~l), and given p~z, each firm i~ j
maximizes its period-2 profits a;2 by selecting p;z - p~~ (as a function
of Lhe history of the game). Period-2 consumers make their purchase
decisions in order to maximize their net benefits, and their beliefs are
fulfilled: p2Nz - n;12 and (1 - p~)Nz - nBZ. Notice that there is
a coordination problem when (m;,m~) -(u,r), because in this case
consumers have to choose between incompatible technologies (u; and
T~).
(t-1) Given (m;,m~), and given p~l, each firm i~ j maximizes its total
profits a;~ ~ n;2 by selecting p;l - p;l (when consumers and both firms
act optimally afterwards). Period-1 consumers make their purchase
decisions in order to maximize their net benefits, and their beliefs aze
fulfilled. However, there is no coordination problem because the prod-
ucts for sale (sA and sB) are compatible with each other.
(t-0) Given m~, each firm i~ j maximizes its total profits a;~ -}- a;2 by
selecting m; - m; (when consumers and both firms act optimally af-
terwards).
We require an equilibrium to be subgame perfect. Therefore, it is ensured
that no firm, taking the other firm's equilibrium actions as given, wishes to
change its own actions at each stage of the game. Furthermore, given the
prices in period t, consumers maximize their net benefits by making their
adoption decisions.
[n this paper, we are concerned with the welfare properties of equilibrium.
[n particular, we will argue that, in the presence of network externalities,
market incentives are inappropriate. In view of these results, we concentrate
our attention on the `good' equilibrium. Informally speaking, an equilibrium
is good if it is not Pareto-dominated by some other equilibrium. We look
at eyuilibria in whicó period-2 consumers do not choose both upgraded and
replacement technologies; this is motivated by the idea that an equilibrium
with such a property will be Pareto-inefficient. Formally,7
Assumption 2.4 In an equilibrium, all period-2 consumers choose the sarne
tcchnoloyy.
This assumption is best motivated through an argument from the finite con-
sumer case. As Katz and Shapiro (1986b) argue, in case of finitely many
homuge,umus conauirn~rs, ru~~xistence of two networks (of upgradr,d and re-
placed products) implies that the payoff frorn the two networks is equal.
However, in that case a single consumer can always gain from switching,
Lhus setting into movement a wave of switches by other consumers, which
destroys the equilibrium with coexisting networks.
The second assumption concerns multiple equilibria with single networks.
To avoid any coordination problem in this context, we require that,
Assumption 2.5 When there exist two equilibria with single networks, con-
sumers in period .~ coordinate on the network that maximires their net sur-
plus. If two nchonrks yield the same surpllls for period .2 consumers they
choose the network that yields the (over periods 1 and ~J maximal net sur-
plus.
We now make precise the notions of the inefficiencies that can occur. The
social optimum is defined as the outcome that maximizes welfare. Welfare is
defined as the sum of the total profits and the net consumers' surpluses. A
social planner (who wishes to implement the social optimum) may not only
have to restrict the innovation decisions of the firms, but also the adoption
decisions of period-2 consumers.
We say that an equilibrium exhibits excess inertia when period-2 con-
sumers adopt the upgraded technology although the adoption of the new
technology would yield a higher welfare level. Notice that when both firms
upgrade their product, consumers in period 2 are not able to purchase a new
technology; therefore, in some cases the inefficiency may be attributed to
the firms. Excess momentum arises when consumers in period 2 purchase
the new technology (possibly again because they have no other choice, due
to the technology choices of the firms), while (the introduction and) the
adoption of an upgraded product would be preferred by a social planner.8
2.3 Analysis
In this subsection equilibria will be calculated and compared to socially op-
timal outcomes. We focus on the technological choices of firms in period 0,
i.e., (ma,me)-
Given thc compatibility structure, an installed basc of size Ni is formed
for the initial industry standard. Indeed, all the period-1 consumers purchase
the good from one of the two firms, irrespective of (mA, mH). The reason is
thaL, since both sA aud .9n are compatible with an upgraded producL of any
of the two firms (and incompatible with any new technology), consumers
aze indifferent between the two brands. Therefore, in an equilibrium the
firms price at rnarginal cost in period 1 (p'A~ - pB~ - c) and make zero
profits. However, notice that if at least one firm upgrades its product, then
period-1 consumers' benefits depend on the adoption decisions of consumers
in period 2.
To verify what happens in period 2, we distinguish four cases, correspond-
ing to the pairs of actions that can be chosen in period 0.
(i) (mA, mB) -(u, u). Because uA and uB are compatible with one another
and with the earlier "vintages", the relevant network size is Nr -} NZ.
Consumers compare b(uq, N~ ~ N2) - pAZ and 6(uB, N~ ~ Nz) - pB2.
Firm A is able to capture the entire market because is has a marginal
cost advantage. Therefore, firm B sets the lowest price at which it
would not make a loss were it to make sales, pBZ - c„B, while firm A
sets pAZ "just belown c„H. Sales volumes are nA2 - Nz and nB~ - 0
(and ~~2 - 1).
(ii) (mA, md) -(u, r). Consumcrs comparc h(uA, IV~ -} psNs) - Pnz and
b(re, (1 - Irz)N~) - pes. Define a - b(uA, NI f Nz) - c„~ and Q-
b(rei N2) - cre, the maximum benefits that firm A and firm B can
offer, respectively.
~ If ~ 1 p then firm A wins all the sales; pÁZ - c,,,, -~ (a -(3) -
b(ua, Ni -f Nz) - b(re,1Vs) -~ crB and p'Bx - c.B, while (n,az~ nás) -
(NZ, 0) (the case where ~-(i follows from assumption 2.5).~ If a G (~ then firm B capturea the market; p~~ - c„~ and pBZ -
~B f(Q-a) - b(ra,Ns)-b(uA, Nr tNz) fG,,,, while (n,nz, náz) -
(0, Nz).
(iii) (rnA, my) -(r, u). As in the previous case, define a' - b(rA, Nz) - c,,,
and p' - 6(uR, Nr t Nz) - c„H,
~ If a' ~ p' then firm A attracts all the consumers; p~~ - 6(rA, Nz)-
6(ue, Nr f Nz) f c,.H and P`eY - c,.e, while (n~s, néz) -(Nz, ~).
~ If a' C p' then firm B captures the market; p'AZ - cT~ and péz -
6(ua, Ni ~- Nz) -~rA, Nz) f G,,, while (n,az, ni~z) -(~, Nz) (the
casr, whcre a' -~i' follows again froru asswnption `l.5).
(iv) (mA,mB) -(r,r). Firm B obtains the entire market demand because
of its marginal cost advantage; Pi1z - Psz - c,~ and (nAZ, nBZ) -
(0, Nz).
Now that the outcome is known for each pair of actions (mA,mB), the
garne can be "folded backn and considered as a one-shot game where the
firms choose f.heir actions simultanmusly. A Nash equilibrium in this one-
shot game is an equilibrium pair (m;r,mB) in the overall game. Below, four
parameter ranges are distinguished in which the strategic form is given (with
firm A on the horizontal axis, and firm B on the vertical axis). The payoffs
in these matrices are (7rqr ~ 7rA2, ~Bi t~ez), the total profits of firm A and
firm B, respectively.
The equilibria of the game are compared to the outcomes that would be
selected by a social planner who wishes to maximize welfare. Because of the
marginal cost asymmetries, if the social optimum is attained then either uA
or rB is produced and adopted in period 2. In the first case, the welfare level
is equal to
W(uA) - Nr(b(S„ N, f Nz) - c) f Nz(~uA, Nr f Nz) - c,.a), (1)
while in the latter case, it equals
W(re) - Nt(b(9;, Nr) - c) f Nz(b(re, Nz) - c.e)- (2)10
A social planncr will c.nforcc introduction and adoption of rB if and only if
W(uA) C W(rB), or
Ni(b(s;, Ni f Nz) - b(s„ Ni )) C Nz(Q - a). (3)
We will use inequality (??) to verify if market outcomes aze socially efficient.
A. a~ Q and a' ~~3'. When a is strictly larger than Q, the equilibria are
(u, u) and (u, r). The identification of (u, r) as a Nash equilibrium is
straightforward. To see that (u,u) is an equilibrium, note that c„B -
c„~ 1 a' - J3' if and only if 6(uB, Nl f Nz) - c,,,, ~ 6(rA, Nz) - c,.,,. The
latter inequality holds strictly because a ~(3, and ~3 1 6(rA, Nz) - cr~.




N2(~ug - Cu~) , ~
Nz(~ - A') , 0
r
Nz(a - Q) , 0
~ , Nz(c.,, - crs)
Figure 1: ThP game in case A.
Because a 1,0 and N~(b(s;, N~ f Nz) - b(s;, Nl)) ~ 0, inequality (??)
does not hold. Therefore, welfare maximizing outcomes are (u, u) and
(u,r), siucc t,hey lead to the adoption of uA in period 2. Equilibrium
outcome (r,r) exhibits excess momentum.
13. rr ~~3 and a' C ~i'. Oue ca.n easily vcrify in figurc 2 thaL ( u,u) aud
(u,r) are equilibrium pairs when a is strictly larger than Q. When a
is equal to Q, there is a third equilibrium: (r, r). To see this, note that
G~ - c,B ? Q' - a' if and only if 6(rA, Nz) - cr8 ? b(uB, N~ t Nz) - c„g.
The latter inequality holds strictly because a- Q and a)
b(ua, Ni f Nz) - c~B-
It is easy to verify that the social optimum is effected in (u, u) and







C. a G Q and a' ~ Q'. Figure 3 shows that equilibrium pairs are (u, r)
and (r, r).
In both equilibria technology rB is adopted in period 2. Therefore,
welfare is maximized by the market forces if and only if inequality (??)
holds. The interpretation of inequality (??) is that in order to achieve
coincidence of private and social incentives, the increase in the surplus
of period-1 consumers when the size of their network grows with N2 has
to be. less than the advantage of rB over uA for period 2 consumers. The
market outcomes are inefficient (in the sense that they exhibit excess
tnomentum) ií and only if inequality (??) does not hold.
N2~~us - ~ue) ~ ~
0 , N2((i' - a')
I~iguro 'l: '1'he gaine in casa~ 13.
u r
N2(cuB - c,.,,) , ~
N2(a' - p') , 0
Figure 3: The game in case C.
0 , N2(p - a)
0 , N~(c.,, - c.e)





N2(~uB - Cuw) ~ ~
0 , N2(~3' - a')
Figure 4: The game in case D.
N2(a - (i) , 0
~ , Nz(~.~ - GB)
0 , N2(p - a)
~ , Ns(cr,, - c.e)
Just as in case C, we find that the market outcomes (u, r) and (r, r)12
are optimal from a welfare point of view ií and only if inequality (??)
holds.
'f'hc results of the analysis are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 Suppose assumptions 2.1-~1.5 are satisfied. Then, ifo) Q,
(u, u) and (u, r) are cquilibrium pairs and socially optimal outcomes; if a-(j,
cquilibrium pairs are (u, u), (u, r) and (r, r), socíally optimal oulcomes are
(u, u) and (u, r); if a C~3, equilibrium pairs are (u, r) and (r, r), these pairs
are socially optimal if and only if (??J holds.
An important insight of the analysis so far is that excess innovation is
possible whereati t.oo little innovation is impossible, when ronsumers coordi-
uate e(IicieuLly across cyuilibria. 7"o be pr~~cise, excess rnomentum occurs in
the case where a- (i and (mq, mB )-(r, r), and in the case where a G(i
a.nd (??) dn,`s not huld. In t.hl`se ca.r`s, Lhe net.work for the init.ial standard
ceases Lo grow afti`r period 1. A part of the explanation for this re,~sult is that
period-2 consumers ignore the effects of t,heir adoption decisions on period-1
cousunrers. lu our model there is also another explanation, namely that the
firms do not consider the effects on consumers when they decide on product
innovation and compatibility. This deviation from social optima arises due
to the presence of network externalities, by means of the `stranded base' phe-
nomenon ( Farrell and Saloner ( 1986a)). In the absence of such externalities,
there will be no connection between the two periods, and in period 2 the firm
with the product which yields the largest social surplus will simply capture
the market, via standard (differentiated cost) price competition.
[n this context the precise structure of the model becomes important;
we have assume`d Lhat an upgraded technology is compat.ible with the initial
industry standard in general, not only with the previous version of the same
firm's technology. "1'his structural assumption precludes the possibility of an
upgrading firm making implicit transfers across generations of consumers,
via charging high prices in period 1 and low prices in period 2.
We conclude this section with an observation on the role of the rela-
Lionship between assumption 2.5 and impossibility of excess inertia. Sup-
pose Lhat a G Q, and that (??) holds. When assumption 2.5 is not13
satisfied, it is possible that consumers in period 2 coordinate on uA in-
stead of ry. When firms expect this outcome, they set prices (pÁZ~Paz) -
(b(uA, Nr t Nz) - b(rB, 0) -F crB, c,B). Note that (u, r) is an equilibrium pair
of actions for the firms. The corresponding welfare level is W(uA) C W(rB).
1'his example demonstrates that when consumers are not able to coordinate
on the outcome that maximizes their surplus, excess inertia can occur.
3 A model with heterogeneous consumers
3.1 The model
The results of the analysis in the previous section depend heavily on the
assumption that consumers are homogeneous. We saw that, under general
assumptions, excess momentum is easygoing. Excess inertia does not arise
under the standard assumptions, but is a possibility if period-2 consumers
focus on the "wrong~ technology (assumption 2.5 is violated). However, pref-
erences for different technologies may put more weight in some consumers'
product choice decisions than network sizes. This observation leads us to the
idea that heterogeneity among consumers may result in the coexistence of
networks of incompatible technologies, and possibly in excess inertia without
having consumers coordinating on a"wrong" equilibrium.
We model the idea of consumer heterogeneity in terms of greater or lesser
inclination for new products. When a consumer has to make a choice between
an upgraded product and a new one, her decision will inter alia depend on
her attachment to the old product (or standard). In the model a period-2
consumer does not have the old product, but she may be more or less familiar
with it. A more conservative consumer is inclined to buy the upgraded
product, whereas a more innovative consumer is willing to adopt the new
technology.
This heterogeneity is introduced in period 2, where consumers may have a
choice between upgraded and replacement technology; in period 1, consumers
can only adopt the initial industry standard. We examine heterogeneity in
Lerms of types oí period 2 consumers. We denote the type of a consumer14
by B, where B E [0,1], and the differences across consumers are modelled
in tenns of benefit functions, 6B(x, n). We formally define heterogeneity as
[ol lows:
Assumption 3.1 ('on.cumers in period 2 are heterogeneous with respect to
their óenejil funclion. 7'hey are uniformly distributed with respect to their
type B. Their óenefit function satisfies:
(iJ bB(u;, n) is (weaklyJ decreasing in B,l1n, i- A, B,
(ii) ba(r;,n) is (weaklyf increasing in 9,`dn,i - A, B.
This assumption replaces assumption 2.1 above. It models the idea that
given a fixed network size, a more conservative (lower B type) consumer
derives more gross benefits from an upgraded product than an innovative
(high B type) cunsumer.
The assumption on network externalities is maintained:
Assumption 3.2 Forperiod 1 consumers, b(x,n) ~ h(x,m) whenever n~
m, V.c; and jor period l consumers be(x, n) 1 68(x, m) whenever n~ m,
tlx, B.
The rest of the set-up of the model mmains unchanged.
3.2 Equilibrium concept
The same equilibrium concept as in the previous section is used. Assump-
tion 2.9 is dropped; if heterogeneous preferences are strong relative to network
advantages, then consumers in period 2 may find it in their interest to adopt
incompatible technologies.
The notions ofexcess inertia and excess inertia as explained in section 2.2
are extended in the following way. If the number of period-2 consumers that
purchase an upgraded product in an equilibrium is too high to attain the
maximum welfare level, then that equilibrium exhibits excess inertia. Like-
wise, if too many consumers (more than the number that would be socially
optimal) adopt a new, incompatible technology in period 2 in an equilibrium,
then excess momentum occurs.15
A related issue concerns the degree oí variety of products available in the
market. In the context of markets with heterogeneous consumers, it allows an
explicit examination of the interaction between the forces of differentiation
and compatibility, in a dynamic environment. We say that an equilibrium
exhibits too much (too little) variety if there are more (leas) active networks
in period 2 than what is socially optimal.
3.3 Analysis
We explore the implications of heterogeneity in consumers tastes for the co-
existence of incompatible networks, and the welfare properties of the equilib-
rium more generally: Under what conditions will two incompatible networks
ccexist? Does the market generate excessive or too little incentives for tech-
nological change? Is there too little or too much variety in the market?
We first derive sufficient conditions for coexistence of two incompatible
networks in equilibrium. The following lemma is useful in deriving these
conditions.
Lemma 3.1 !j nA~(u, r) 1 0 and nBZ(u, r) 1 0, then ( u, r) or (r, u) is the
equilibrium pair oj netions jor the firms.
Proof: Recall that c,,,~ G c„B and cTx ~ c,.B. Therefore nA2(u, u) ~ 0,
rB1(u,:~) - 0, rrA2(r,r) - 0, and ~rBZ(r,r) ~ 0. Since profits in period 1 are
equal to zero, the game in simplified strategic form is given by figure 5. The




Figure 5: The game in simplified strategic form.
proof follows immediate from figure 5. ~
We next consider conditions on the primitives of the model that are suf-
ficient to meet the requirements derived in the above lemma. A first step in16
this direction is the definition of strong pnejerences. We say that consumera
have strong preferences for a good if they are willing to overcome network
disadvantages suffered by that good. More formally, consumers have strong
pndc~rencis if for i, j- A, H, and for some c~ 0, 0„ ~ 0 and 0, G 1 the
following inequalities are satisfied,
b'B E(0, Bu) : be(ur, Ni )- c,.: ~ 6a(r„ NZ) - c,~ -i- e
`dB E( B„ 1] : be(ri, ~) - c., ? be(u„ Ni f N2) - c,,, t e. (4)
Inequalities (??) state that extreme types, i.e., types near 0 and near 1,
have strong preferences. When products are valued at marginal costs, the
net benefits of u; for a consumer of a type near 0, when she is the only person
buying that product, are larger than the net benefits she could obtain by
joining the network of r~ buyers. On the other hand, a consumer type neaz
1 prefers r~ irrelevant of its network size when the products are priced at
marginal cost. Proposition 3.1 shows that i[ inequalities (??) are satisfied
then in an equilibrium both firms can earn positive profits under (u, r).
Proposition 3.1 Suppose assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. Ij there exist B„ ~
0 and B~ G 1 such that inequalities (??J hold, then in an equilibrium aAZ(u, r) ~
0 and n~z(u, r) ~ 0.
Proof: Suppose that (mA, mB) -(u, r), and that there exist B„ ) 0 and
Or G I such that inequalities (??) hold.
First, suppose pBZ ? c,B; then given that inequalities (??) are satisfied,
for some B G 0,,, there is an e ~ 0 such that,
bB(un, N~ ) - G.~ ~ be(re, Nt) - Pes f c
Civen assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, this implies that for any p;,~ such that c„~ G
pA~ G c,,,, f e, for all B E [0, B], optimal choice is brand A, and hence nA2 ~ 0.
Since p'A~ is optimal, the equilibrium profits must be strictly positive too, i.e.,
rr`(u, r) ) 0. It is easy to show that in an equilibrium pB2 G c,B generates a
contradiction. This completes the proof for aAZ(u, r) ~ 0.
Second, suppose that pÁ~ ~ c,,,, is given. Analogous arguments as in the
previous casc hold for firm B. This completes the proof. ~17
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of proposition 3.1
and lemma 3.1, and gives sufficient conditions for coexistence of two incom-
patible networks in eyuilibrium.
Corollary 3.1 S4[~~OSf lhat assumpfions 3.I and "J.`l hold. tjlhcrc exist an
c~ 0 and B„ ~ 0 and 9, G 1 such that inequalities (??) hold, then in any
equilibrium nA2 ~ 0 and nB2 1 0.
These conditions can be weakened if one allows for conditions on beliefs of
agents; here the focus has been on the primitives of the model, however.
Thc~ sufficient conditions are fairly intuitive: If there is some measure of
agents whose choice of a brand is relatively insensitive to tlre size of the
networks then incompatible networks will coexist. In cont.rast to section 2,
avsuming that period-2 consumers adopt one technology cannot be justified
by Pareto-optimality because there may be two groups of consumers with
strong preferences for incompatible products.
The next question that arises naturally concerns the welfare properties
of coexistence equilibria. To examine them we construct examples which
suggest that equilibria with coexisting networks can, depending on parameter
values, exhibit excess inertia as well as excess momentum. The examples
suggest that, in markc~l,s wil.h hcterogenc~ous consumers, and with net.work
effects, market incentives do not reflect social benefits accurately.
Consider the following benefit functions. In period 1, the benefit function
is
b(x,n) - a~ k~(n),x - sa,se.
!n period 2, a consumer of type B has benefit function
bi-k~(n) ifx-uA,uBandOCBcz
(b- z) f kz(n) if x- uA,uB and 2 G 9 C 1
bs(~,n) - -
(d - y) -~ k3(n) if x- rA, rB and 0 G 6 G 2
d-~ k3(n) if x- rA, rB and 2 G B G 1.
The paramete,rs satisfy a G b G d, i.e., there is technological progress. For
simplicity, we assume that N~ - N~ - N and c- 0.I8
Example 1: Excess momentum. Suppose that N- 1~2; k~(n) - k~(n) -
k3(n)-n,b'n;6-2,z-1.75,d-3,y-2.625;q,,,-0.05,c,.,, -3.5,
c„g - 2.75 and c,B - 2.75.
]t is possible to show that the following configuration can be sustained
in an equilibrium: mA - u, mB - r; P;~i - Pet - 0~ Pá2 - 2.75,p'BZ - 3.25;
nA2 - nBZ - 1~4. It is easy to check that the inequalities (??) are not
satisfied; they are, thus, not necessary for coexistence of two networks. De-
note the social welfare levels attained in case of a single network with only
upgraded product, with only replacement product, and coexisting networks
by W(u), W(r) and W(u,r), respectively. It is easy to compute these ex-
pressions for this example. They are as follows,
W(u) N .5a f L54,
W(r) - .ia - .031,
W(u,r) - .5a ~ 1.175.
Thus, the equilibrium with ccexistence exhibits excessive momentum relative
Lo Lhi~ socially opl.imal outrome. In Lhc~ abs~nce of network effects, however,
such a coexistence~ eyuilibrium is iu tlie present example socially optimal.
'I'6~~ intuition behind this iucfficiency is as follows: Consumers havc strong
preíerences for some type of product and firms exploit this fcature to create
`local' monopoly type effects; but in the presence of network externalities
this generates too high an incentive to introduce a new standard, and leads
to excessive momentum.
Example 2: Excess inertia. Suppose that N- 1; kl(n) - k2(n), b'n,
k~(n) - n for n G N and k~(n) - N t 1~16(n - N) for n~ N, k3(n) - n`dn;
6-2,z- 1.15,d-3,y-1.15;c,,,, - 2,c,,, - 3.5,c„g -2.2and
c,B - 2.25.
It is possible to show that the following configuration can be sustained
in an equilibrium: mA - u, mé - r; PÁi - Pái - 0, pÁ2 ~ 3.03, pB2 - 3.5;
nA2 - nB~ - 1~2. Denote the social welfare levels attained, as in example 1,




'I'hc~ sucial opl,itnum is uut attaiucvl in the ccN.xislcnre ccptilibriutu. In par-
ticular, the outcome where all period-2 consumers adopt the new standard
yields a higher welfare level. We observe excess inertia. This is not true in
LI11' á4I1N1'IICI' Uf nc,l.wurk extc~rnalities; Lhen Lliere c"xisl.s an c"quilihriunt with
coexisting networks and it is socially optimal. "Phis social sub-optimality
emerges due to the desire of firms to exploit `local' monoploy effects of prod-
ucL differentiation, which generates too high (low) a market share for u(r)
technology, leading to `too little' innovation, relative to the social optima.
The two examples above also dcmonstrate that market equilibrium may
exhibit excessive variety. The following example shows that an equilibtium
ntay exhibit too little variety (as in Farrell and Saloner (1986b)). In view of
the general intuition underlying the principle of maximal difíerentiation, this
is an interesting issue.
Example 3: Too little variety. Suppose that N- 1; k~(n) - 2n, for
n G 3~2,k~(n) - 1.5 f n for n 1 3~2; kz(n) - n, k3(n) - 1.5n for n C 1,
k3(n)-.5tnforn, 1; 6-1,z-.75;d-4,y-2;c,,,, - 2,c,,c -3.5,
c„B - 2.20, cre - 2.25.
It is possible to show that the following can be sustained in an equilib-
rium: m~ - u, me - r; P,ti - Pét - 0, Pás - 2, Pss - 3.5; nAZ - 0, nBZ - 1.
'1'he soc~ial welfare levels can be computed as follows:
W(u)-a~-4.125
W(r) - a -~ 4.250
W(u,r) - a f 5.125
Thus, the socially optimal outcome involves coexistence of networks, whereas
there is an equilibrium in which one network covers the entire market. This
difference between social optima and market equilibrium is due to two rea-
sons: first, the network effects that period 2 consumers generate for period1 consumers, and second, the coordination problem faced by the consumers
preferring an upgraded product in case they would like to switch to the other
network.
The examples demonstrate that a market equilbrium may exhibit excess
momentum (example 1) or excess inertia (example 2). Moreover, it may
exhibit too much variety (examples 1 and 2) or too little variety (example
3).
4 Conclusion
This paper has been concerned with the question: In the presence of network
externalities, what is the nature of market incentives for innovation? We
consider a dynamic duopoly model in which the firms have to decide on
the nature of the successor technology: an upgmding of the old product
allows a firm to retain compatibility with the established industry network,
whereas a major innovation commits it to a replacement technology which is
incompatible with the extant standard.
We show that in markets with homogeneous consumers, major innova-
tions may occur in excess of what is socially desirable (excess momentum),
and that too little innovation (excess inertia) is not possible if consumers
can coordínate on networks which yield their generation maximum payoffs.
For markets with heterogeneous consumers, sufficient conditions for the co-
existence of two incompatible networks (of an upgraded and a replacement
technology) are derived and it is shown that, depending on the parameter
values, such market outcomes can exhibit too little or excessive innovation.
Finally, we show that equilbrium may exhibit excessive as well too little
product~technology variety, relative to the social optimum.21
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